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Abstract 
We develop a heterogeneous-firms model with trade in goods, labor mobility and 
credit constraints due to moral hazard. Mitigating financial frictions reduces the 
incentive of high-skilled workers to migrate to one region such that an unequal 
distribution of industrial activity becomes less likely. Hence, financial market 
development has opposite regional implications as trade liberalization. While the 
former leads to more dispersion of economic activity across space, the latter tends 
to drive clustering. This has immediate implications for income inequality both 
between regions and skill groups. According to our model, financial development 
reduces inequality in both dimensions. 
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1 Introduction
There has been a long and still unsettled debate whether the integration of markets leads
to a more or less equal distribution of economic activity and thus income across regions.
While the conventional view suggests that market integration should lead to convergence
and thus more equal living conditions, there is also a prominent opposition claiming that
market integration magnifies inequality (Myrdal, 1957, Lewis, 1977, Krugman 1991). The
latter argument fuels policy makers’ fears that market integration benefits primarily rich
regions with a large home market. Accordingly, many federations have regional policies
in place that transfer resources from the core to the peripheral regions. For instance, the
European Union spends about 50 billion euros per year on regional cohesion representing
about one third of the overall EU budget.1 In Germany, it is even stated in the constitution
that governments have to ensure sufficiently equal living conditions across regions. There
is surprisingly little work that links the role of financial markets to this debate. It is
surprising because the importance of the financial sector for the real economy is widely
acknowledged and we have seen a very pronounced development of financial markets in
recent decades.
We show that more developed financial markets work towards more equality of income
both within and across regions. This implies that deeper financial markets allow for more
integrated product markets (that promise welfare gains from trade) without jeopardizing
the goal of equal regional living conditions. The underlying economic mechanism for
these results builds on access to external finance. Deeper financial markets allow the
least productive firms to get funded which raises the number of firms, but reduces the
share of exporters. This reduces inter-regional competition of firms such that clustering
of economic activity turns out less attractive. As trade liberalization raises the share
of exporters, a reduction in transport costs stimulates regional inequality which is well
understood.
Our model features trade in goods, labor migration, credit constraints, endogenous
entry and exit of heterogeneous firms, and occupational choice (for the latter see Lucas,
1978, and Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008, 2012). The financial friction stems from a moral-
hazard problem in the tradition of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). While entrepreneurs
1Regional cohesion is the second largest item of the EU budget amounting to more than 350 billion
euros during 2007-2013 and 336 billion euros during 2014-2020 (see EU Commission, 2011).
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can choose their effort level to maximize their payoff, lenders cannot directly observe
the managers’ behavior. Hence, asymmetric information introduces credit constraints as
lenders demand a higher return from a given investment to ensure a higher payoff for
entrepreneurs and thus diligent behavior. This leads to credit rationing as less productive
firms cannot commit to diligence despite positive net present values. To obtain these
selection effects, we need to introduce some kind of firm heterogeneity. We deviate from
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in ignoring different endowments of firm assets, but rather
follow Melitz (2003) in introducing different levels of productivity. This helps us capturing
the well-documented fact that the smallest (i.e. least productive) firms benefit most from
financial development (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2008).
The building blocks of our model are strongly supported by empirical evidence. There
is a growing literature in international economics that has identified financial market de-
velopment as an important determinant of trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Lower credit constraints may generate a comparative advantage (Egger and Keuschnigg,
2010a and 2010b, Ju and Wei, 2011) and lead to more exports both in terms of volume and
destinations (Beck 2002 and 2003, Manova, 2008 and 2012, Muuˆls, 2008).2 Further, sev-
eral influential empirical papers have identified economic determinants for the location of
industry. For example, Davis and Weinstein (2002) show that locational fundamentals are
crucial for the pattern of economic activity across space, but increasing returns to scale
determine the intensity of concentration. Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2010) disentangle
the three Marshallian explanations for agglomeration: (i) technology spillovers, (ii) labor
market pooling, and (iii) proximity to input suppliers (vertical linkages) to save transport
costs. They find that the latter features most prominently in the data. Even though
input-output linkages are not present in our model, it can be shown that the resulting
location pattern results from the same forces as in Krugman (1991) on which we build.
Moreover, Davis and Weinstein (2003), Hanson and Xiang (2004) and Redding and Sturm
(2008) provide convincing evidence for the home-market effect which is at the center of
the location mechanism in our model.
2Chor, Foley, and Manova (2008) show that development of financial markets in the host country
reduces horizontal FDI due to more entry and thus competition of local firms, but stimulates affiliate sales
to third countries. For example, Antra`s and Caballero (2009) show that trade and capital flows may be
complements in classical trade theory under financial frictions. Antra`s, Desai, and Foley (2009) examine
how weak investor protection and financial frictions affect the prevalence of multinational firms and the
international financing of investment.
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The role of market integration for inequality has been addressed in a number of litera-
tures. In finance, for example, Acemoglu and Zillibotti (1997) as well as Martin and Rey
(2004) argue that rich countries have more developed financial markets providing better
diversification and thus higher investment levels. This mechanism contributes to a widen-
ing gap between rich and poor countries. Matsuyama (2004) develops an overlapping-
generations model with credit market imperfection and investment. He shows that finan-
cial markets may cause inequality as symmetric equilibria become unstable and regions
separate into rich and poor. An early example from the growth literature is Krugman
(1981) pointing out that a difference in capital-labor ratios magnifies due to capital accu-
mulation over time. This process contributes to more inequality between regions. Yet, the
empirical evidence suggests that there is a negative correlation between financial market
development and income inequality (see e.g. Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2003; Liang, 2006; Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Levine, 2007). We highlight an effect of financial markets on income in-
equality that works via goods trade and yields predictions that are consistent with the
negative correlation between financial market development and income inequality identi-
fied in the empirical literature.3
There is also a large literature on trade and labor that studies the role of trade liber-
alization for wage inequality between workers with different skills and even within groups
having the same skills (Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer, 2011, Egger and Kreickemeier,
2008, 2012, Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010, and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010). Fi-
nally, it is by now well-understood how trade liberalization affects the migration decision
of production factors in the context of international goods trade (Krugman, 1991, and
Krugman and Venables, 1995). None of these papers focuses on the role of financial fric-
tions and in particular none of the previous studies accounts for the interaction between
trade integration and financial market development which is at the heart of our paper.4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce a model of trade,
labor mobility, and credit constraints. In Section 3, we derive equilibrium conditions and
3In a working paper version of this paper, we provide empirical evidence for a negative relationship
between financial market development and and the concentration of economic activity across European
regions. This finding is consistent with our model and suggests that financial markets play a decisive role
for location decisions of firms (see von Ehrlich and Seidel, 2013a).
4A recent example of moral hazard and factor mobility, but without credit rationing, is Hakenes and
Kranich (2010). Credit constraints affect the pattern of agglomeration simply through a cost effect while
our model features complex selection effects altering average industry productivity, the number of firms as
well as the share of exporters. This turns out essential for the equilibrium distribution of economic activity.
Finally, our model entails a richer set of economic motives that drive the location decision of workers.
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solve the model. In section 4 we analyze the effects of financial market development on
the location of economic activity and the distribution of income across regions. Section 5
concludes with a summary of the main findings and implications for regional policy.
2 The model
Consider two regions i and j that are endowed with immobile low-skilled (L) and mobile
high-skilled workers (H). Both regions are identical ex ante, but may differ ex post due to
migration of high-skilled workers. This gives rise to an endogenous allocation of industries
across space (see Krugman, 1991). Unless otherwise stated, we report expressions for
region i stressing that similar equations exist for region j.
2.1 Preferences and demand
Individuals derive utility from consuming two goods, a homogeneous good Y and a differ-
entiated commodity Q, where the level of utility is determined by
Ui = Q
α
i Y
1−α
i . (1)
The differentiated good is composed of a mass V of varieties v that are aggregated accord-
ing to Qi =
(∫
v∈V qi (v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
. Note that V is determined endogenously in general
equilibrium and σ represents the constant elasticity of substitution between any two vari-
eties. Further, qi(v) describes the consumption level of variety v in region i – which may
be a local or an imported type.
Maximizing (1) subject to the budget constraint delivers total demand for a variant of
the differentiated commodity
qi (v) =
pi (v)
−σ
P 1−σi
αEi, (2)
where Pi = [
∫
v∈V pi (v)
1−σ dv]1/(1−σ) denotes the price index, pi (v) represents the con-
sumer price for variety v in country i and Ei is individual expenditure for consumption
(which is equal to income). With Cobb-Douglas preferences, each individual spends a
constant income share on each good such that Qi = αEi/Pi and Yi = (1 − α)Ei/PY i.
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Plugging these demand functions into (1) yields indirect utility
Wi =
αα (1− α)1−αEi
Pαi P
1−α
Y i
. (3)
2.2 Technology and organizational choice
The homogeneous good is sold in a perfectly competitive market and requires low-skilled
labor as the only input. We assume that one unit of low-skilled labor is required to produce
one unit of output. Choosing Y as the nume´raire and imposing zero trade costs across
borders implies that the price for Y is equal to unity in both regions and so are wages of
low-skilled workers.
The manufacturing sector is characterized by monopolistic competition using high-
skilled workers as the only factor of production. Fixed production costs generate increasing
returns to scale such that each company exclusively manufactures one commodity for the
market. High-skilled workers have the choice between founding a firm (and becoming an
entrepreneur) and working as an employee. However, the productivity level of the firm,
ϕ, is not known ex ante so that in equilibrium workers are indifferent between earning
the expected payoff from becoming an entrepreneur and the observed wage rate. As
long as the expected payoff is greater than the observed wage rate there will be a high-
skilled worker who finds it profitable to participate in the lottery to become an active
entrepreneur. A high value of ϕ implies a low number of workers hi to produce one
unit of output, qi (ϕ) = ϕhi. Further, high-productive firms earn strictly higher profits
than low-productive firms (which we show formally below). We follow the literature on
heterogeneous firms by assuming that ϕ follows a commonly-known distribution function
of the Pareto type, that is G (ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−k, where k captures the shape parameter. We
have further normalized the scale parameter to one to simplify notation.
High-skilled workers have an incentive to participate in the productivity lottery as long
as expected firm profits exceed their opportunity costs, that is the wage rate wi they could
earn as an employee in the manufacturing industry.5 This builds on the assumption that
entrepreneurs cannot seek employment in one of the manufacturing firms once they have
decided to establish a firm.6 If their obtained productivity level implies profits, they start
5We derive this condition formally below.
6Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) make a similar assumption.
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producing. If ϕ is too low, they exit again and end up without income.7
Those entrepreneurs with sufficiently high productivity choose between two organiza-
tional modes. They can either solely serve domestic consumers or decide to produce for
the export market in addition. We refer to the former type as domestic firms (superscript
d) and to the latter firm type as exporting firms (superscript x). Both organizational
forms imply different levels of fixed costs. To serve consumers domestically, companies
need to incur fd units of high-skilled labor while exporting requires an additional fixed
investment of the same factor so that fx > fd. Shipping goods to the other region is
subject to iceberg transport costs implying that τ > 1 units of the final good have to be
sent for one unit to arrive at the final destination abroad. The choice between domestic
sales only and additional exporting is governed by profits of each of these activities which
we derive in subsection 2.4 below.
2.3 Credit market
Firms crucially rely on external finance to start their operations. In particular, we assume
that companies need to secure external finance for fixed costs while variable costs can be
covered from revenues. Credit is provided by a perfectly-competitive banking sector. If a
high-skilled worker has chosen to become an entrepreneur and to found a domestic firm,
she needs fdwi of external finance. If she chooses an exporting type, she requires f
xwi.
Writing a financial contract on these fixed investments implies asymmetric information
between the lender and the borrower. In particular, we assume that banks cannot observe
the chosen effort level of the entrepreneur. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the
entrepreneur can choose to behave diligently implying a probability of making profits of
ψb < 1. Alternatively, she can opt for shirking which reduces the probability of making
profits to 0 < ψs < ψb, but promises private benefits Bwi that we express in terms of
high-skilled wages.8 As the lender can neither observe the chosen effort level nor proof ex
post whether the manager has shirked, financial contracts are subject to a moral-hazard
problem. We assume that both agents are risk neutral. The entrepreneurs who do not
succeed in making profits are hit by a stochastic shock which forces them to exit before
7One could modify this setting by assuming that entrants only need to invest a fraction of their oppor-
tunity cost w to find out their productivity level. This would leave them with a fraction of market wages,
but does not affect the key insights.
8Alternatively, we could denote private benefits in terms of the nume´raire which would not affect results
qualitatively. However, our specification yields less complex expressions enhancing readability.
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entering production. While the probability of being hit by the bad shock can be reduced
from 1− ψs to 1− ψb by diligent behavior, it is equally distributed across productivities.
Provided the borrower works with high effort, the lender is only willing to grant the loan
if the expected payoff from doing so covers the principal. Denoting by R`i the repayment to
the bank for a loan to a domestic firm (` = d) and an exporting firm (` = x), respectively,
we can express the zero-profit condition for the lenders as
ψbR
`
i = f
`wi. (4)
The rate of return ρ of such an investment is given by R`i = (1 + ρ) f
`wi. Combining both
equations delivers 1 + ρ = 1/ψb. As ψb < 1, ρ is strictly positive reflecting a risk premium
that compensates for credit default of unsuccessful firms.
To avoid losses from lending, the bank has to make sure that the expected income
of the entrepreneur is sufficiently high so that she can repay the principal plus the risk
premium. We assume that the marginal firm only has a positive net present value if the
entrepreneur behaves. Hence, the bank has to rule out shirking by allowing a sufficiently
high income to the entrepreneur. We refer to this condition as the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC). For domestic firms, this is given by
ψb
[
r`i (ϕi)
σ
−R`i
]
≥ ψs
[
r`i (ϕi)
σ
−R`i
]
+Bwi. (IC)
The term in brackets denotes the income of the entrepreneur, that is the difference between
operating profits r`i (ϕ)/σ and the repayment to the bank R
`
i where operating profits are
strictly increasing in productivity. Hence, the entrepreneur can pledge only a fraction of
her income to the lenders without violating the incentive compatibility constraint, namely
r`i (ϕ) /σ−Bwi/∆ψ, where we have defined ∆ψ ≡ ψb−ψs. Firms with a higher productivity
than the marginal firm may earn expected profits that suffice to repay the principal even
under shirking. But as diligent behavior implies strictly higher expected profits, shirking
is never an appealing option for these entrepreneurs.9
To ensure zero profits of banks, the expected pledgeable income must not fall short of
the principal. We refer to this condition as the participation constraint (PC) which can
9Since the marginal firm that meets (IC) cannot repay the principal plus risk premium under shirking,
firms that are capable of doing so must have greater operating profits than the marginal firm. This in turn
implies a higher pledgeable income without violating (IC).
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be expressed as
ψb
[
r`i (ϕ)
σ
− Bwi
∆ψ
]
≥ f `wi. (PC)
We observe from (PC) that banks are only willing to allow a credit if the entrepreneur
generates expected operating profits that cover at least ψbBwi/∆ψ + f
`wi. As operating
profits increase in productivity (which we show in the following subsection), only more
productive companies receive external finance. In contrast to a world without moral
hazard, some entrepreneurs are unable to secure external funding to pay for fixed costs
because they cannot commit to behave diligently. Even if they offered a higher risk
premium to the lender, the bank would not grant the loan as the remaining income of
the entrepreneur would be too low to meet the incentive compatibility constraint. Hence,
entrepreneurs who do not meet (PC) due to a too low productivity level cannot start
producing and thus end up with no income. As entrepreneurs are able to raise funds from
a perfectly competitive banking sector, those that satisfy (PC) offer the lowest possible
claim to the lender that meets (IC), that is R`i = f
`wi(1 + ρ).
10 This result shows that
the entrepreneur receives the entire surplus if the project is funded.
The model features two determinants of credit constraints: Firm productivity and
agency costs. First, firms are more likely to receive outside finance if they are more
productive and thus larger. As profits strictly increase in ϕ, more productive firms leave the
entrepreneur with a higher income inducing her to behave. Second, agency costs determine
the entrepreneurs’ ability to borrow. These costs are determined by a combination of
private benefits and the success probabilities under diligence and shirking and can be
measured by cwi, where we introduce the agency cost parameter c ≡ ψbB/∆ψ on which we
rely repeatedly in the subsequent analysis. We observe from (PC) that this term captures
the non-pledgeability of income. The higher the value, the more difficult it is to secure
external finance for a given level of expected operating profits. With respect to the first
component of agency costs, a higher level of private benefits Bwi requires a higher income
of the entrepreneur to make diligent behavior more attractive than shirking. The second
part of agency costs comprises the inverse of the likelihood ratio ∆ψ/ψb. According to
Tirole (2006), the likelihood ratio measures the reduction in the probability of success if the
entrepreneur decides to shirk which can also be interpreted as the marginal productivity
of behaving diligently. As lenders can infer better the behavior of borrowers at a high
10Her income is then given by r`i (ϕ)/σ − f `wi(1 + ρ) ≥ Bwi/∆ψ which is a reformulation of (IC).
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likelihood ratio, it is easier for entrepreneurs to get access to external finance in this case.
This definition of agency costs is our key measure of the severeness of credit constraints.
We understand a reduction of this friction as the basis for financial development. It is
commonly understood that “the agency cost is influenced not only by the project’s and the
entrepreneur’s characteristics, but also by the surrounding legal, regulatory, and corporate
environment” (Tirole, 2006, p.118).11
2.4 Profits
We now derive profits of both domestic firms (` = d) and exporting firms (` = x) that
govern the entrepreneurs’ choice of firm types. As firms face a constant price elasticity
of demand, profit-maximizing prices are chosen as constant mark-ups over variable costs.
For domestic sales and exports, we respectively have
pii (ϕ) =
σwi
(σ − 1)ϕ pij (ϕ) =
στwi
(σ − 1)ϕ,
where the first subscript always refers to the place of production and the second subscript
to the place of sale. Revenues and profits for each market are given by
rii (ϕ) =
pii (ϕ)
1−σ
P 1−σi
αEi rij (ϕ) =
pij (ϕ)
1−σ
P 1−σj
αEj
piii (ϕ) = rii (ϕ) /σ − fdwi (1 + ρ) piij (ϕ) = rij (ϕ) /σ −
(
fx − fd
)
wi (1 + ρ) ,
where we have accounted for the risk premium firms need to pay on their fixed costs.
Since each surviving firm has to earn at least Bwi/∆ψ plus the respective fixed costs
f `wi(1 + ρ), the decision to become an exporter is affected by the moral-hazard problem
only to the extent that the additional fixed costs (fx − fd)wi(1 + ρ) have to be financed
externally (including the risk premium). As long as operating profits from exporting do
not fall short of the extra credit costs, it pays for an entrepreneur to export. We derive
the export productivity cutoff ϕ∗ij by using the condition pi
x
i
(
ϕ∗ij
)
= pidi
(
ϕ∗ij
)
which is
equivalent to
rij
(
ϕ∗ij
)
σ
=
(
fx − fd
)
wi (1 + ρ) . (5)
11See also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).
9
Hence, an entrepreneur with productivity draw ϕ∗ij is indifferent between paying the higher
fixed costs fx to become an exporter and paying the lower fixed costs fd to serve only
the domestic market. Every entrepreneur with productivity draw beyond ϕ∗ij decides to
set up an exporting firm. Note that the participation constraint (PC) is always met for
an entrepreneur who drew a productivity ϕ > ϕ∗ij and accordingly decides to establish an
exporting firm.12
3 Equilibrium
To determine equilibria, we proceed as follows. We first assume that both regions are able
to trade both goods while high-skilled workers are immobile. We refer to this case as the
short-run. In a second step, we derive the long-run equilibrium where high-skilled workers
choose their region of residence and employment based on real wages. We discuss both
cases sequentially in the following two subsections.
3.1 Immobile workers
To describe the equilibrium, we need to derive the productivity cutoff ϕ∗ii, that is the
productivity level of the least efficient (marginal) producer, as well as equilibrium wages
and the number of firms.
Domestic productivity cutoff. To obtain ϕ∗ii, we combine the free-entry condition
(FE) with the marginal-credit-access condition (MCA). In contrast to Melitz (2003),
MCA substitutes for the zero-cutoff profit condition because the marginal firm in our
model is determined by getting access to external finance rather than by zero profits.
Here, the marginal firm earns strictly positive profits in the presence of moral hazard.
High-skilled workers enter the industry as entrepreneurs until expected profits equal
entry costs, that is their opportunity cost from working as an employee in the Q-sector,
wi. Formally, this condition reads:
ψb (ϕ
∗
ii)
−k p¯ii = wi. (FE)
12Under exporting, operating profits are rxi (ϕ)/σ = r
d
i (ϕ)/σ+ rij(ϕ)/σ while fixed costs become wi(1 +
ρ)[fd + (fx − fd)] such that the participation constraint reads ψb[rdi (ϕ)/σ+ rij(ϕ)/σ−Bwi/∆ψ] ≥ wifx.
Accordingly, if (PC) is fulfilled for the domestic firm type it must be fulfilled for the exporting firm type
as well because ϕ > ϕ∗ij from (5).
10
The left-hand side describes average profits from domestic sales and exporting condi-
tional on surviving in competition, 1 − G (ϕ∗ii) = (ϕ∗ii)−k, and not being hit by the ex-
ogenous shock of failure ψb. Surviving firms can expect to earn piii (ϕ˜ii) domestically and(
ϕ∗ii/ϕ
∗
ij
)k
piij (ϕ˜ij) from exports where
(
ϕ∗ii/ϕ
∗
ij
)k
reflects the probability of becoming an
exporter conditional on being active in the domestic market. Further, ϕ˜ii and ϕ˜ij represent
average productivity levels of all operating firms and those that export, respectively. Due
to the Pareto distribution, ϕ˜ii/ϕ
∗
ii = ϕ˜ij/ϕ
∗
ij = [k/(k − σ + 1)]1/(σ−1) holds as a constant
relationship between average and cutoff productivities.13
It is convenient to express the probability of exporting in terms of domestic productiv-
ity cutoffs only. To do this, we derive operating profits of the marginal firm that secures
external finance. From the participation constraint (PC) we get
rii (ϕ
∗
ii)
σ
= fdwi (1 + ρ) +Bwi/∆ψ. (6)
Entrepreneurs with a productivity draw below ϕ∗ii will not obtain credit and accord-
ingly do not succeed in setting up their firm. Using (6) jointly with (5) and rji(ϕ
∗
ji) =
rii[(ϕ
∗
jiwi)/(τwj)], we can establish the following link between the export cutoff in j and
the domestic cutoff in i:
ϕ∗ji = τ
(
fx − fd
fd + c
) 1
σ−1 (wj
wi
) σ
σ−1
ϕ∗ii. (7)
Recall that the agency cost parameter c measures the severeness of the credit constraint.
It is immediate that an increase in foreign wages lowers the export cutoff ceteris paribus.
Domestic firms become relatively more competitive and more firms export. To ensure
that exporting firms also serve local consumers, we restrict the parameter space to (fx −
fd)/(fd + c) > 1.14 It is thus evident that the conditional export probability is limited
to range between zero and unity. Taking region i’s export cutoff based on (7), we can
13For deriving the average productivity we assume k > σ − 1. Technically, this is to ensure that the
integral over the productivities converges and represent a standard assumption in the literature on trade
and heterogeneous firms.
14Note that for symmetric regions wi = wj and ϕ
∗
ii = ϕ
∗
jj such that ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
ii implies ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
jj and
ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
jj implies ϕ
∗
ij > ϕ
∗
ii. For the general case with asymmetric regions, requiring that firms also serve
the domestic market when exporting – i.e. ϕ∗ji > ϕ
∗
ii and ϕ
∗
ij > ϕ
∗
jj – imposes a limit on relative wages in
the two regions. The necessary and sufficient conditions for ensuring that only domestically active firms
start exporting are derived in Appendix C.
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formulate the conditional export probability as(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k
= τ−k
(
fd + c
fx − fd
) k
σ−1 (wj
wi
) σk
σ−1
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗jj
)k
. (8)
For symmetry, we can infer that the conditional export probability is decreasing in
fx − fd and τ while it is increasing in fd as well as in the agency cost parameter c.
Further, a higher relative wage in region j reduces that regions competitiveness such that
exporting for firms based in region i becomes more likely.
Let us now proceed to the marginal-credit-access condition (MCA). The participation
constraint (PC) pins down operating profits of the marginal firm that survives in the
domestic market as stated in (6). This allows us to express average profits as a function
of domestic cutoff productivity levels. We label this equation the marginal-credit-access
condition which is given by 15
pii =
(1 + ρ)wi
k − σ + 1
kc+ (σ − 1)
fd + τ−k [ (fd + c)k
(fx − fd)k−σ+1
]σ−1(
wj
wi
) σk
σ−1
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗jj
)k .
(MCA)
As is evident from (MCA) average profits ceteris paribus increase in c. This is because a
more severe credit constraint prevents less profitable firms from securing external finance
and thus entering the market. Using (FE) and (MCA) for each region delivers two
equations that can be solved for the domestic cutoff in i,16
ϕ∗ii =
 γ(σ − 1)k − σ + 1 1− φ2
1− φ
(
wj
wi
) σk
σ−1

1
k
, (9)
where we have defined γ ≡ ck/(σ− 1) + fd and φ ≡ τ−k
(
c+fd
fx−fd
) k−σ+1
σ−1 (c+fd)
γ . Except for
the wage rates, all parameters determining the cutoff productivity are the same for both
regions. For symmetric regions, wi = wj and the cutoff is strictly increasing in c. This
is intuitive as a more severe credit constraint precludes the least productive firms from
15See Appendix A for further details on the derivation of this condition.
16Appendix B provides further details on the derivation of the domestic cutoffs and on the comparative
statics.
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producing and only the more productive firms remain. Put differently, it requires higher
operating profits (which is only possible with a higher ϕ) to meet (PC). Once regions
become asymmetric the cutoffs remain strictly positive in both regions and the region with
the higher wage rate features the lower cutoff productivity (see Appendix C for a formal
proof). From the participation constraint the latter seems surprising as we would expect
more firms to be truncated for higher fixed costs. Yet, there is a countervailing effect which
follows from the free-entry condition: Facing higher wages than the foreign region reduces
competitiveness and thus average profits which ceteris paribus has to be compensated by
a higher probability to survive the lottery, that is by a lower cutoff productivity.
Wages and the number of firms. So far, the discussion was based on a thought
experiment with fixed wages. However, both wages and the number of firms in each
country, Mi and Mj adjust endogenously in general equilibrium. Accordingly, to obtain
these variables for the general case of an asymmetric allocation of high-skilled workers
across regions, we need to employ the respective labor-market-clearing conditions (LMC)
jointly with goods-market-clearing equations (GMC). Let us denote by L the global stock
of low-skilled workers which are distributed symmetrically across both regions such that
Li = Lj = L/2. The global stock of high-skilled workers is denoted by H = Hi + Hj
and λ represents their share residing in region i. Expressing the number of exporters and
the number of entrants in each region respectively as Mij =
(
ϕ∗ii/ϕ
∗
ij
)k
Mi and Mie =
(ϕ∗ii)
kMi/ψb, we can formulate the market-clearing condition for high-skilled workers in
region i as17
λH = Mi
[
qii (ϕ˜ii)
ϕ˜ii
+
fd
ψb
]
+
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k
Mi
[
qij (ϕ˜ij)
ϕ˜i
+
fx − fd
ψb
]
+ (ϕ∗ii)
k Mi
ψb
. (LMC)
Labor demand on the right-hand side of (LMC) has three components. (i) The first
component captures variable and fixed labor inputs of all firms in country i that produce
for the domestic market plus the fixed inputs of firms that were hit by the bad shock. (ii)
The second component refers to the additional labor inputs needed to serve the export
market following the same logic. (iii) Finally, some high-skilled workers have chosen to
become entrepreneurs which is captured by the last term. A fraction of these entrants is
not productive enough and has never applied for a loan while another fraction has secured
17The number of entrants corresponds to the number of workers who want to become an entrepreneur.
Only ϕ∗iiψb of those will eventually become an active entrepreneur.
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external finance but was hit by the bad shock before production started. Both groups end
up with no income.
Next, we introduce the goods-market-clearing condition which equates net exports
of manufactured varieties with net imports of the homogeneous good. The latter is the
difference between local expenditure for the homogeneous good and local production of
that good. For region i, this can be expressed as (1−α)[L/2 +λHwi]−L/2 such that the
goods-market-clearing condition reads:18
(1− α)λHwi − αL/2 =
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k
Mirij (ϕ˜ij)−
(
ϕ∗jj
ϕ∗ji
)k
Mjrji (ϕ˜ji) . (GMC)
The left-hand side represents the difference between aggregate revenues from exports in i
and j. If production in the manufacturing industry is larger in i than in j, region i is a
net exporter of manufactured goods and a net importer of the homogeneous good. Note
that (LMC) and (GMC) are functions of the price index which is given by
Pi =
[
Mi
(
σwi
(σ − 1) ϕ˜ii
)1−σ
+
(
ϕ∗jj/ϕ
∗
ji
)k
Mj
(
τσwj
(σ − 1) ϕ˜ji
)1−σ] 11−σ
. (10)
Similar expressions exist for region j’s labor market and market-clearing such that we can
use the four equations to solve for Mi,Mj , wi and wj for given distribution of high-skilled
workers.
3.2 Endogenous distribution of industry
We now relax the assumption that high-skilled workers are immobile and allow for an
endogenous distribution of manufacturing firms across countries. It is noteworthy that
it is not firms that move, but workers. Changing the allocation of labor will result in
endogenous adjustments of firms and wages to meet the equilibrium conditions derived in
the previous subsection. To describe the long-run equilibrium, we first need to specify the
migration equation. High-skilled workers migrate as long as the target region offers higher
18Note that for goods-market-clearing the value excess demand for Q products in i has to equal the value
of excess production of Q in j, EDQi = EP
Q
j . At the same time, the value of excess demand for Y in j
has to equal the value of excess production of Y in i, EDYj = EP
Y
i . Balanced trade requires with two
countries and two sectors that EPQj = EP
Y
i such that we obtain ED
Q
i = EP
Y
i and ED
Y
j = EP
Q
j . In our
framework the latter immediately yields (GMC).
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indirect utility. We compute this value by plugging in the equilibrium outcome of the
endogenous variables Mi,Mj , wi, wj into (3) and calculate the utility differences for the
representative mobile laborer in regions i and j for each labor allocation λ. We identify a
migration equilibrium if either (i) indirect utilities of high-skilled workers are equated in
both regions, so Wi = Wj , or (ii) all workers and industry have agglomerated in one of
the two locations. For interior equilibria, we must have
wi
Pαi
=
wj
Pαj
. (11)
Three forces determine the long-run equilibrium. (i) Firms prefer to locate in the
larger market as this promises higher profits in the presence of trade costs (Krugman,
1980). This effect is referred to as the home-market effect and works in favor of allocating
the manufacturing industry entirely in one region (due to higher nominal wages). (ii) The
second effect is called market-crowding effect and works as a dispersion force. The idea is
that – for given market size – firms prefer fewer competitors as this increases their market
share and hence profits. To meet the labor-market clearing condition, nominal wages need
to fall when competition increases. (iii) Finally, the price-index effect states that mobile
workers prefer to live in the region with the lower price index. This is usually the larger
region as fewer varieties need to be imported and thus, consumer prices are lower. This
effect works in favor of agglomeration.19
Like in Krugman (1991), endogenous variables enter in a non-linear fashion such that
closed-form solutions are generally infeasible. However, we are able to derive closed-
form solutions for the symmetric equilibrium with λ = 0.5 and corner solutions with
λ = 1 ∨ λ = 0.20 Moreover, we derive an implicit function that describes the critical level
of trade costs below which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable (break point). For
the general case, we solve the model numerically.
Before we study the role of credit constraints for the location of industry, we solve the
model in the absence of credit constraints (c = 0) for different values of trade costs. This
allows us to document that the economic mechanisms in our model produce the same
19Note that the mechanism highlighted in our benchmark model works also in more simple versions that
do not feature all three forces. For instance, quasi-linear preferences as in Pflu¨ger (2004) or exogenous
regional expenditure shares as in Martin and Rogers (1995) would weaken agglomeration forces but the
comparative statics with regard to financial market development remain qualitatively the same.
20See Appendix D for the symmetric and the corner equilibria.
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Figure 1: Trade Costs and Location
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location pattern as in Krugman (1991) – even though he abstracts from heterogeneous
firms and export fixed costs. At high levels of trade costs, the symmetric equilibrium with
λ = 0.5 is the only stable outcome while corner solutions (λ = 1 or λ = 0) evolve with low
trade barriers. A standard illustration of equilibria in this context is Figure 1 that shows
differences in high-skilled workers’ indirect utility for each possible labor allocation λ and
three distinct values of trade costs.21 The functions represent equilibria for each level
of λ when high-skilled workers are assumed to be immobile (short-run). If we allow for
mobility (long run), though, interior equilibria are only stable if the slope at Wi−Wj = 0
is negative. Otherwise, a deviation from the symmetric equilibrium raises indirect utility
in the target region inducing more outmigration until all mobile workers reside in one
country.
It is apparent that full agglomeration of the manufacturing industry occurs at low
levels of trade costs (τ = 1.1). For an intermediate level of trade costs (τ = 1.5), there are
five steady states. However, only the full agglomeration equilibria (λ = 0 and λ = 1) and
21For Figures 1,2,4 we choose the following parameter values: fx − fd = 35, k = 4, α = 0.4, and σ = 3.
All the results are insensitive to the choice of these parameters. In choosing the parameter values we
account for the so called ’no-black-hole’ condition (σ − 1)/σ > α.
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the symmetric dispersion equilibrium (λ = 0.5) are stable. Increasing trade frictions to
τ = 2 renders dispersion forces dominant such that only λ = 0.5 is a stable equilibrium.22
4 Financial market development
4.1 Location equilibria
Let us now turn to the role of credit constraints for the equilibrium distribution of mo-
bile workers. For this exercise, we keep trade costs constant (at τ = 1.7) and vary the
agency cost parameter instead. In Figure 2 the solid, dashed, and dotted functions de-
pict the short-run equilibria for the c = 0, c = 10, and c = 20 scenarios where all other
parameters are kept constant. A tightening of credit constraints (an increase in c) leads
to an anti-clockwise rotation of Wi − Wj around λ = 0.5. Figure 2 helps us identify
long-run industry location equilibria. In the absence of credit constraints, that is c = 0,
we observe that only the symmetric interior equilibrium is stable. Full agglomeration is
unstable. For an intermediate level of credit constraints, c = 10, five potential equilibria
exist: two asymmetric interior, a symmetric interior and two agglomeration equilibria.
In contrast to the symmetric interior and the agglomeration equilibria, the asymmetric
interior equilibria are not stable. Raising the financial constraints’ intensity further to
c = 20 results in a destabilization of the symmetric equilibrium and implies that asym-
metric interior equilibria no longer exist. Hence, for sufficiently tight credit constraints
the entire manufacturing industry is located in one region.
After we have analyzed the effects of credit constraints for a given level of trade costs we
now study the interaction between credit constraints and trade costs. Evaluating the total
derivatives of the equilibrium conditions (LMC) and (GMC) at the equilibrium values
of the endogenous variables for λ = 1/2 enables us to express the parameter constellation
for which the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable analytically. In Appendix D we
obtain an implicit solution for the break point τB which indicates the critical level of
trade costs below which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. It can be shown that an
increase in agency costs leads to a marked increase of the break point τB. Hence, stable
22In a recent paper, von Ehrlich and Seidel (2013b) show in more detail that firm heterogeneity does not
affect the general pattern of industry location in the Krugman (1991) model: Trade liberalization renders
clustering of high-skilled workers in one location more attractive. However, firm heterogeneity leads to full
agglomeration already at higher levels of trade costs compared to the homogeneous-firms version.
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Figure 2: Credit Constraints and Location
0 0.5 1
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15

c=10
c=0
c=20
Wi-Wj
full-agglomeration equilibria occur at a higher level of trade costs when credit constraints
are more severe. This indicates that net agglomeration forces must increase in c such that
credit constraints stimulate the clustering of industries in one location. Or, alternatively,
financial market development establishes an equal distribution of economic activity for a
wider range of trade costs. In sum, financial market development and trade liberalization
have opposite effects for the location incentives of mobile factors. Besides agency costs, the
break point level of trade costs is determined by fixed costs, f `, the underlying productivity
distribution, k, and by the expenditure share of the manufacturing sector, α. In Figure 3
we illustrate the comparative statics of the break point with respect to these parameters
in which we focus on τB(c).
In each of the three panels in Figure 3 we plot the break point as a function of the
agency cost parameter where the first panel considers different levels of net export fixed
costs fx − fd, the second panel varies the productivity distribution entrepreneurs draw
from, and the third panel highlights the interaction of ∂τB/∂c with the expenditure share
of manufacturing products α. The τB(c) curves display the critical τ − c combinations
where symmetry just starts to become unstable while the areas above and below the
individual curves mark τ − c combinations where symmetry represents a stable and an
unstable equilibrium, respectively.
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics of the Break Point
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Note: The figures display the break point level of variable trade costs τB as a function of agency costs
c for various levels of fixed trade costs fx − fd, firm heterogeneity k, and expenditure shares of the
manufacturing sector α. The curves display the critical τ − c combinations where symmetry just starts
to become unstable while the areas above and below the individual curves mark τ − c combinations
where symmetry and full concentration apply in long-run equilibrium, respectively. The functions follow
immediately from (D.5) in Appendix D. In each of the plots, the red line corresponds to a benchmark
with k = 4, σ = 3, fx − fd = 35. The green lines correspond to cases where the change-parameter of
the respective panel i.e. fx−fd, k, or α is higher than in the benchmark while the blue lines mark cases
with lower levels than in the benchmark. Note that the parameter space for c is limited to c < fx−2fd
as we require ϕ∗ji > ϕ
∗
ii.
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First and most importantly, all panels confirm that the break point τB(c) is always
increasing in agency costs implying that symmetry is stable for high levels of variable
trade costs and low levels of agency costs. This illustrates that (symmetric) financial
market development (i.e. a reduction in c) weakens the incentives for high-skilled workers
and industries to cluster in one location while trade liberalization implies the opposite.
Turning to panel (i), a higher level of net export fixed costs fx−fd reduces ceteris paribus
the symmetry breaking level of variable trade costs. This is intuitive as higher export fixed
costs reduce the propensity to export according to (8). As argued above, equalizing forces
become relatively stronger implying an equal distribution of the manufacturing industry
a stable equilibrium for a wider range of trade costs. Alternatively, this relationship is not
surprising as in our model effective trade costs consist of a fixed and a variable component
which can substitute for each other. Holding agency costs constant the symmetry breaking
indirect utility level can either be reached by a relatively high level of export fixed costs in
combination with rather low variable trade costs or by a relatively low level of fx − fd in
combination with a high level of τ . In panel (ii), we vary the distribution shape parameter
k which is a measure of firm heterogeneity. A high value of k implies a lower probability of
drawing a high productivity level ϕ leading to less heterogeneity of firm productivities. We
see from (8) that the export propensity declines in k such that symmetry-breaking occurs
at lower levels of trade costs.23 Lastly, we observe from panel (iii) that a larger expenditure
share of the manufacturing sector, α, corresponds with stronger net agglomeration forces
as the τB(c) curve is shifted upwards. This link is well understood in the regional economics
literature and also present in our framework.24 Intuitively, a low expenditure share reduces
the size of the home market α(L/2+wλH) speaking against clustering. Further, the price
index responds less sensitively to changes in the allocation of high-skilled workers if prices
of manufactured goods have a low weight in the consumption basket.
4.2 Income inequality
Let us now turn to the implications for income inequality. In Figure 4, we plot the ratio
of real wages in the two regions Wi/Wj as a function of trade costs for alternative levels of
agency costs. While Panel A reports relative wages in the vertical dimension, Panel B offers
23See von Ehrlich and Seidel (2013b) for a more detailed exposition of firm heterogeneity for location
decisions.
24See Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud (2003) for details.
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the bird’s-eye perspective to better illustrate the shape of the full-agglomeration surface
(low τ and high c). The blue color identifies symmetric equilibria where inter-regional
incomes are identical while “dark red” captures the equilibria with the most unequal
relative wages. Note that we have normalized the total number of low-skilled workers
to L = Li + Lj = 1 − α and the total number of high-skilled workers to Hi + Hj = α.
This ensures that the nominal wage of Q-sector workers equals the agricultural wage in
the symmetric and full concentration equilibria. Hence, regional inequality is not simply
driven by a concentration of the scarce factor which receives a higher reward on the labor
market, but by real wages and the access to product markets.
Let us start from a symmetric equilibrium (blue). If trade costs fall below the break
point, the symmetric equilibrium collapses causing a sharp increase in inequality as in-
dividuals in i are able to consume more manufactured products at lower costs than in
j. The two panels A and B nicely illustrate that the break point decreases in financial
development (lower c). Interestingly, the more integrated regions become, the more im-
portant is a frictionless capital market for avoiding a divergence in per-capita GDP. This
is because for low levels of trade costs already a moderate level of credit constraints yields
divergence while for high trade costs even very poor financial market institutions will not
break symmetry.
Beyond this insight, Figure 4 further reveals how income inequality changes with trade
costs and financial development once clustering of the manufacturing industry has oc-
curred. Generally, smaller distances to the break point imply more inequality. However,
a further reduction in trade costs reduces inequality (see Krugman and Venables, 1995)
while inequality increases with deeper financial markets (lower c) on the full-agglomeration
surface. This fact is best illustrated in Panel B as we move from dark red to light blue
with lower τ and higher c. In the full-agglomeration scenario, financial development raises
inequality as the number of firms (and thus product varieties) strictly increases. This effect
relies on love-of-variety preferences and is certainly of second-order importance compared
to the pronounced jump in inequalities once we move from a symmetric to an asymmet-
ric equilibrium. Importantly, inequality is strictly lower if economic activity is evenly
distributed across both regions.
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Figure 4: Per-Capita Income Inequality
Panel A
Panel B
Note: “Blue” marks areas with equal distribution of per-capita GDP across regions and “red” marks
areas with very unequal distribution of per-capita GDP. Panel B is a two dimensional representation
of the same equilibria illustrated in Panel A.
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We can also make statements about income inequality between high-skilled and low-
skilled workers across both regions. It is obvious that a higher inequality between regional
GDP must be associated with higher inequality between skill groups as clustering of in-
dustry is driven by the agglomeration of high-skilled workers in the core region.
4.3 Intuition
What is the intuition behind these effects? Why does financial development have the
opposite impact on the location of industry as trade liberalization? As is well understood
from the economic geography literature (Krugman, 1991), high trade costs cannot be as-
sociated with full agglomeration of manufacturing firms. If markets face little competition
from firms in the other market, it always pays off to leave the agglomeration and produce
in the periphery to exploit market power. For lower levels of trade costs, the advantages
of producing in the larger market dominate. These insights must remain valid even if
we endogenize the export propensity. Lower trade barriers not only reduce the consumer
price of imported varieties, but also increase the number and share of available products
in each market.
In our model, the export propensity is also affected by financial development. We
observe from (9) and (7) that agency costs have a greater impact on the domestic pro-
ductivity cutoff than on the export productivity cutoff. Hence, increasing agency costs
eliminate particularly small non-exporter firms. Intuitively, this is because being an ex-
porter implicitly signals to be an entrepreneur with high productivity and thus no incen-
tive to shirk. Such an entrepreneur satisfies the incentive constraint also for higher agency
costs. Accordingly, we see from (8) that the share of exporting firms decreases in trade
costs and increases in agency costs if both regions are identical, such that wi = wj and
ϕii = ϕjj . A lower export propensity implies less inter-regional competition such that the
agglomeration forces decrease relative to the dispersion forces.
To further improve intuition, let us consider the boundary cases of symmetry and full
concentration. With a low share of exporters concentration of the manufacturing industry
in one region cannot be a stable situation because the first firm that moves to the periphery
will have a quasi-monopoly power there earning very high profits. Hence, the dispersion
forces dominate in this case. In contrast, if agency costs are high and only large firms
survive this means that almost all firms export. In such a situation firms do not gain
23
from moving to the periphery because this does not allow them to avoid competition.
Hence, they prefer to cluster and capitalize on the agglomeration benefits due to a larger
home market. In this case, the dispersion force is negligible and agglomeration forces
dominate. As financial development (a decrease in agency costs) reduces the share of
exporters, a symmetric distribution of workers and manufacturing firms turns out to be a
stable equilibrium for a wider range of trade costs (see Figure 3).
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a model that combines goods trade, labor migration and
credit constraints due to moral hazard to study the role of financial market development
for the distribution of economic activity and income both across and within regions. We
show that better access to external funds reduces the incentives for high-skilled workers
to cluster in one region such that economic activity and thus wealth is more equally
distributed. This result stands in contrast to previous research in the finance literature
where globalization of financial markets was shown to cause more inequality.
In our framework, the effects of financial market development work through integrated
product markets. Mitigating credit constraints reduces the export propensity such that
clustering of all firms in one location becomes less attractive. An increase of trade bar-
riers would have the same effects. Exporters are not credit-rationed because only very
productive, and thus large firms find it profitable to serve customers abroad. Given that
these firms also make large profits from domestic sales, their managers have no problem in
committing to diligent behavior to secure the loan. In this case, diligent behavior implies
a strictly higher income for entrepreneurs.
Our results have important implications for public policies. As politicians are often
concerned about regional cohesion, it is crucial to understand the implications of financial
market development for the location pattern of industries. In this regard, our paper
conveys good news in the sense that lower financial frictions work as a countervailing force
to trade integration in reducing the incentive for clustering. Further, deeper financial
markets allow for more integrated product markets (that promise welfare gains from trade)
without jeopardizing the goal of equal regional living conditions.
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Appendix
A Deriving the marginal-credit-access condition (MCA)
Average expected profits accrue from domestic operating profits rii(ϕ˜ii)/σ minus fixed
costs for domestic sales and from foreign operating profits rij(ϕ˜ij)/σ minus export fixed
costs. The latter have to be weighted by the probability of becoming an exporter con-
ditional on being active in the domestic market. Hence, the average expected profits in
region i read
pii =
rii (ϕ˜ii)
σ
− fdwi(1 + ρ) +
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k [
rij (ϕ˜ij)
σ
− (fx − fd)wi(1 + ρ)
]
.
Substituting rii (ϕ˜ii) =
(
ϕ˜ii
ϕ∗ii
)σ−1
rii (ϕ
∗
ii) and rij (ϕ˜ij) =
(
ϕ˜ij
ϕ∗ij
)σ−1
rij
(
ϕ∗ij
)
– which holds
because revenues from the respective market differ only with respect to firm-specific pro-
ductivity – as well as rii (ϕ
∗
ii) = σwi
[
fd
ψb
+ B∆ψ
]
and r
(
ϕ∗ij
)
= σwi
fx−fd
ψb
from equations
(5) and (6) yields
pii =
[(
ϕ˜ii
ϕ∗ii
)σ−1
(fd + c)− fd
]
wi(1 + ρ) +
(
ϕ∗ii
ϕ∗ij
)k ( ϕ˜ij
ϕ∗ij
)σ−1
− 1
 (fx − fd)wi(1 + ρ).
Note that we have substituted ψb = 1/(1+ρ) and c = B/[∆ψ(1+ρ)]. Further substituting
the Pareto distribution’s characteristics ϕ˜ii/ϕ
∗
ii = ϕ˜ij/ϕ
∗
ij = [k/(k − σ + 1)]1/(σ−1), as well
as the export probability from equation (8) delivers the average expected profits as stated
in equation (MCA).
B Deriving the domestic cutoffs
Using the marginal-credit-access conditions (MCA) together with the free-entry conditions
(FE) yields
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 = (ϕ
∗
ii)
−k
(
ck
σ − 1 + f
d
)
+
(
ϕ∗jj
)−k
τ−k
(
fx − fd
) k−σ+1
1−σ
(
wj
wi
) σk
σ−1 (
fd + c
) k
σ−1
k − σ + 1
σ − 1 =
(
ϕ∗jj
)−k ( ck
σ − 1 + f
d
)
+ (ϕ∗ii)
−k τ−k
(
fx − fd
) k−σ+1
1−σ
(
wi
wj
) σk
σ−1 (
fd + c
) k
σ−1
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for countries i and j, respectively. This equation system can be solved for the domestic
cutoffs in the two countries:
(ϕ∗ii)
k =
σ − 1
k − σ + 1
(
ck
σ−1 + f
d
)2 − [τ−k (fx − fd) k−σ+11−σ (fd + c) kσ−1]2
ck
σ−1 + f
d − τ−k (fx − fd) k−σ+11−σ
(
wj
wi
) σk
σ−1
(fd + c)
k
σ−1
(
ϕ∗jj
)k
=
σ − 1
k − σ + 1
(
ck
σ−1 + f
d
)2 − [τ−k (fx − fd) k−σ+11−σ (fd + c) kσ−1]2
ck
σ−1 + f
d − τ−k (fx − fd) k−σ+11−σ
(
wi
wj
) σk
σ−1
(fd + c)
k
σ−1
.
Substituting γ = ck/(σ − 1) + fd and φ ≡ τ−k
(
c+fd
fx−fd
) k−σ+1
σ−1 (c+fd)
γ delivers (9).
Since γ(σ−1)k−σ+1 > 0 the cutoffs are strictly positive as long as φ < 1 and
1
φ >
(
wj
wi
) σk
σ−1
.
Under the parameter restrictions k > σ − 1 and c < fx − 2fd it can easily be shown
that φ < 1 holds true. Moreover, assuming that only domestically active firms operate
on the export market requires 1φ >
(
wi
wj
) σk
σ−1
as will be proven in Appendix C below. For
symmetric countries, i.e. wi = wj , it can easily be shown that the cutoffs are strictly
increasing in c if ∂φ∂c > 0 which holds true for k > σ − 1. For asymmetric countries the
effect of c on the cutoffs cannot be determined without taking into account the impact of
c on the relative wages wj/wi. This, however, cannot be done analytically, but requires
to solve the model numerically.
C Ensuring that only domestically active firms start exporting
It is a common assumption of the heterogenous-firms literature and in line with empirical
evidence, that exporting firms also serve the domestic market. This is equivalent to
requiring ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii and ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
jj which at the same time ensures that the conditional
export probability ranges between zero and unity. In our framework, these assumptions
are reflected by the following constraints in the symmetric and asymmetric case:
1. For symmetric countries, wi = wj and ϕ
∗
ii = ϕ
∗
jj , and the export cutoffs of the two
countries can be stated as functions of the domestic cutoffs (see Section 3):
ϕ∗ij = τ
(
fx − fd
fd + c
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗jj ϕ
∗
ji = τ
(
fx − fd
fd + c
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗ii.
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Accordingly, for symmetric countries and trade costs converging to unity the export cutoffs
are greater than their domestic counterparts as long as fx− fd > fd + c is satisfied. Since
c ≥ 0 this requires that the additional costs for becoming an exporter firm exceed the
fixed costs for setting up a domestic firm fx − fd > fd.
2. For asymmetric countries, ensuring that only domestically active firm export restricts
the support region of wi and wj to
wi
wj
<
(
fx − fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk
∧ wj
wi
<
(
fx − fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk
or
wi
wj
<
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
∧ wj
wi
<
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
, (C.1)
where γ ≡ ck/(σ − 1) + fd and φ ≡ τ−k
(
c+fd
fx−fd
) k−σ+1
σ−1 (c+fd)
γ . Note that f
x − fd Q γ
depending on whether ck/(σ−1) Q fx−2fd. In our general setting, we allow for parameter
constellations that render either the first constraint (in case ck/(σ − 1) > fx − 2fd) or
the second constraint binding (in case ck/(σ − 1) < fx − 2fd). In both situations the
applicable constraint constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii and
ϕ∗jj > ϕ
∗
ji as will be shown in the following.
Think of a situation where wi > wj > 0, and
wi
wj
>
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
. This implies that the
domestic cutoff in j (ϕ∗jj) as derived in Appendix B is negative while the domestic cutoff
in i (ϕ∗ii) is positive. Recall that f
x − fd > 0, such that ϕ∗ii > 0 and ϕ∗jj < 0 imply
from equation (7) that the export cutoff in j (ϕ∗ji) is positive and the export cutoff in i
(ϕ∗ij) is negative. Hence, under the assumptions that wi > wj > 0 and
wi
wj
>
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
the
ordering of domestic and export cutoffs in region i is ϕ∗ij < ϕ
∗
ii which means that there
are some firms in i that export, but do not produce for the domestic market. Similarly,
assuming wj > wi > 0 and
wj
wi
>
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
yields ϕ∗ji < ϕ
∗
jj such that some firms in j
produce for the export market only. Accordingly, a necessary assumption for precluding
firms in both regions from exporting without producing for the domestic market is wiwj <(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk ∧ wjwi <
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
which ensures that ϕ∗ij and ϕ
∗
ji are positive. However, if
fx − fd < γ this condition may not be sufficient as there could be solutions where all
cutoff productivities are positive but ϕ∗ij < ϕ
∗
ii or ϕ
∗
ji < ϕ
∗
jj still applies. From equations
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(7) we observe that wiwj <
(
fx−fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk ∧ wjwi <
(
fx−fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk
has to be fulfilled in such a
scenario in order to guarantee ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii and ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
jj .
Together, the two constraints on relative wages from above constitute sufficient con-
ditions for ensuring that only domestic producers become exporters. Again, consider a
situation where wi > wj , but let the relative wage constraints in (C.1) be satisfied for
now. Then from the domestic-cutoff equation (9), both ϕ∗ii and ϕ
∗
jj are strictly posi-
tive. Taking a closer look at equation (9) reveals that – under the above assumptions(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
> wiwj , and
(
1
φ
)σ−1
σk
>
wj
wi
– the country with the higher wage rate features the
lower domestic cutoff productivity. That is ϕ∗jj > ϕ
∗
ii for wi > wj which under the con-
straints wiwj <
(
fx−fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk ∧ wjwi <
(
fx−fd
φγ
)σ−1
σk
implies from equation (7) that ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ji,
ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii, and ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
jj hold true. Therefore, the overall productivity ordering for the
wi > wj scenario is ϕ
∗
ij > ϕ
∗
ji > ϕ
∗
jj > ϕ
∗
ii > 0. Similarly, the wj > wi scenario yields
ϕ∗ji > ϕ
∗
ij > ϕ
∗
ii > ϕ
∗
jj > 0 under the relative wage constraints.
D Deriving the symmetric equilibrium, the agglomeration equilibrium,
and the break point
At λ = 1/2 it holds true that dWi = −dWj . Therefore, it follows that the symmetric
equilibrium is stable as long as an additional worker in i decreases real wages in i – which
corresponds to an increase of real wages in j and a negative real wage differential Wi−Wj .
Hence, the break point is characterized by the level of trade costs that satisfies:
dWi
dλ
|λ=1/2 = 0 ⇔ dwi = αwi
dPi
Pi
for λ = 1/2 (D.2)
Solving for the break point involves tedious algebra. First, we totally differentiate the
labor market clearing condition (LMC) and the goods-market-clearing condition (GMC).
Second, we use this equation system to compute the total derivatives of the price index, the
total derivative of the wage rate, and the total derivative of the number of firms (which is
part of the price index). Second, we determine the equilibrium values of wi, Pi, and Mi at
λ = 1/2 and evaluate the above mentioned total derivatives at the symmetric equilibrium.
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Symmetric equilibrium:
At the symmetric equilibrium, it can easily be shown from the goods-market-clearing
condition (GMC) that the wage is given by wi =
αLi
(1−α)Hi . To simplify computation we
follow most of the literature and normalize the total number of low-skilled workers to
L = Li + Lj = 1− α and the total number of high-skilled workers to Hi +Hj = α. This
implies that the high-skilled wage under symmetry is unity. With λ = 1/2, wi = wj = 1,
and Mi = Mj , the price index from (10) can be simplified to:
Pi = M
1
1−σ
ii
[(
σwi
(σ − 1) ϕ˜ii
)1−σ
+
(
ϕ∗jj/ϕ
∗
ji
)k ( τσwj
(σ − 1) ϕ˜ji
)1−σ] 11−σ
= M
1
1−σ
ii
σ
(σ − 1)
(
k
k − σ + 1
) 1
1−σ
(
k − σ + 1
γ(σ − 1)(1 + φ)
) 1
k [
1 + φ(fd + c)γ
]
, (D.3)
where γ = ckσ−1 + f
d and φ = τ−k
(
c+fd
fx−fd
) k−σ+1
σ−1 (c+fd)
γ . Using the price index jointly with
the labor-market constraint (LMC) we can compute the equilibrium number of firms
under symmetry:
Mii =
α (1 + k − σ)ψ
2σ [fd(1 + k − σ) + γ(kφ+ σ − 1)] . (D.4)
Break point:
Using the total derivatives of the labor market constraint (LMC) together with the total
differential of the goods-market-clearing condition (GMC) – both evaluated at λ = 1/2 –
we can compute dwidλ and
dMii
dλ . Finally, we need to compute the total derivative of the price
index and evaluate it at λ = 1/2 as well. Plugging in dwidλ ,
dMii
dλ , and dP
(
dwi
dλ ,
dMii
dλ
)
into
the definition of the break point from (D.2) we get the following condition that describes
the critical parameter constellation for the symmetric equilibrium to just become unstable:
(σ − 1)2(φ− 1)
ασ(φ+ 1)
[
γφ−A(c+ fd)
]
= (D.5)
(c+ fd)(σ − 1)A+ γφ(1 + 2k − σ)− 2k
2γφ
[
(c+ fd)A+ γφ
]
fd(k − σ + 1) + γ(kφ+ σ − 1) ,
where A = 1−α1+α . This condition yields the break point τB and it is plotted for different
parameter constellations in Figure 3
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Agglomeration equilibrium:
At the agglomeration equilibrium it holds that λ = 1 and hence, Hj = Mj = 0. With the
above normalization the labor market clearing condition becomes:
Hi = Mi
[
α (Li + wiHi)
P 1−σi
(
σwi
σ − 1
)−σ
(ϕ˜i)
σ−1 + fd/ψ
]
(D.6)
+Mi
(
ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
ij
)k [
τ1−σ
αLj
P 1−σj
(
σwi
σ − 1
)−σ
(ϕ˜ix)
σ−1 + fx/ψ
]
+Mi (ϕ
∗
i )
k /ψ.
The price indices with full agglomeration simplify to :
Pi = M
1
1−σ
i
(
σwi
(σ − 1) ϕ˜i
)
, Pj =
(
ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
ij
) k+1−σ
1−σ Piτ. (D.7)
The goods-market-clearing conditions imply that the high-skilled wage is unity in the
agglomeration equilibrium:
Mi
(
ϕ∗i /ϕ
∗
ij
)k αEj
P 1−σj
pix (ϕ˜ij)
1−σ = (1− α)wiHi − αL (D.8)
wi = 1
The marginal firms that enter the domestic and exporting markets are characterized by
the following conditions:
ri (ϕ
∗
i ) = σf
dwi(1 + ρ) + σ
Bwi
∆ψ
, rij
(
ϕ∗ij
)
= σ(fx − fd)wi(1 + ρ). (D.9)
Employing the above conditions jointly with the price indices we obtain the conditional
export probability: (
ϕ∗i
ϕ∗ij
)k
=
(
1− α
1 + α
)
fd(1 + ρ) + B∆ψ
(fx − fd)(1 + ρ) (D.10)
From the free-entry condition (FE) we derive the cutoff productivity in the agglomeration
equilibrium: Combining the with free entry from manuscript equation (FE) we obtain the
cutoff productivity:
ϕ∗ii =
σ − 1
k − σ + 1
[
kc
σ − 1 + f
d +
1− α
1 + α
(fd + c)
]
. (D.11)
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